

CITIZEN'S TRUST IN PUBLIC AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN NEPAL

**Research and Consulting Service Department
Nepal Administrative Staff College**



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ABSTRACT

Trust in public and political institutions is an indication of democratic governance. The legitimacy of public and political institutions is heavily reliant on citizens' trust, which is critical for a healthy democracy. In this regard, this study aimed to examine the pattern of citizens' trust in the public and political institutions of Nepal. The data for this study was taken from Nepal National Governance Survey 2017/18, and analyzed with an ordered logit model. This study shows that citizens' trust in public and political institutions is not satisfactory. Citizens' trust in political institutions is relatively lower than that for public institutions. Citizens have a low level of trust in ministers, political parties, and parliamentarians. This indicates that citizens are not satisfied with the performance, actions, and behavior of the political institutions. However, citizens have more trust in public institutions, as compared to political institutions. Some public institutions have a relatively high level of trust, while others have it at a low level. Public institutions such as the army and the media have a higher level of citizens' trust, while police and civil servants/bureaucrats have a lower level of citizens' trust. It is noteworthy that the citizens' trust in public and political institutions is also influenced by demographics, social associations, and other variables.

Keywords: Citizen, trust, democracy, legitimacy, public and political institutions

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Citizens' trust in public and political institutions is one of the key factors of a healthy democracy. This report contributes to the existing literature on citizen trust on institutions by examining citizens' perception of trust in public and political institutions. This chapter introduces the background, purpose and research questions, rationale/relevance, and the scope of this study.

1.1 Background

The concept of citizens' trust in public and political institutions has received considerable attention from academia all over the world. Citizens' trust in public and political institutions is crucial to effective democratic governance. Trust enhances the effectiveness and legitimacy of a democratic government (Braithwaite & Levi, 1998). It is reflected as a measure of the success and failure of democracy in a nation. A higher level of citizens' trust in public and political institutions is a sign of successful governance. As per Yosuf and Nauman (2015), public trust in government, and its institutions is seen as an effective way to extend the progress and opulence of any society and the effectiveness of governance mechanism. That may be the reason governments wish to confirm a higher degree of citizens' trust. However, trust has been steadily declining in both developed and developing countries (Van der Meer, 2017). As per Edelman Trust Barometer (2017), citizens' trust in governments around the world has declined significantly. Restoring citizens' trust in public and political institutions is challenge for both developing and developed countries.

Undoubtedly, trust builds effective institutions that help the government to function more effectively (Ahn & Kang, 2002). In general, citizens trust in those institutions, when they believe that they deliver what they have promised. Citizens assess the performance of public and political institutions and make their perception of trust. Mishler and Rose (2001) argued that institutional trust is the product of institutional performance. Institutions that perform poorly are assessed negatively by citizens (Jamil, Askvik, & Baniamin, 2016). The citizen perception of trust is, therefore, shaped directly or indirectly by the performance of institutions. The increased trust supports and validates democratic legitimacy, and institutional effectiveness (Hetherington, 1998). If institutions fail to function efficiently and effectively, an environment of declining legitimacy can arise, leading to serious opposition that may even threaten the survival of a regime (Hutchison & Johnson, 2011).

In Nepal, the Government has made many attempts over the years to achieve a higher degree of citizens' trust in public and political institutions, but these attempts have little success. The democracy of a country sustains when there is a high level of citizens' trust. When public and political institutions fail to meet the expectations of the citizens it leads to distrust. Public and political institutions gain trust by meeting citizens' desires and demands. Once institutions lose citizens' trust it is not easy to restore. Losing citizens' trust means a low level of support and unstable government which will make the government not be effective in producing public goods (Ahn & Kang, 2002). Citizens want public and political institutions to be accountable, non-corrupt, trustworthy, transparent, responsive, competent, impartial, and capable to deliver services effectively and efficiently. In this backdrop, the study aims to examine the pattern of citizens' trust in public and political institutions of Nepal.

1.2 Purpose and Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to critically examine the pattern of citizens' trust in the public and political institutions of Nepal. In particular, it addresses the following research questions:

- What is the level of citizens' trust in the public and political institutions of Nepal?
- What makes citizens' trust in public and political institutions of Nepal?
- To what extent citizens' trust in public and political institutions is differ by demographics, social association, and other variables?

1.3 Rational and Relevancy of the Study

Citizens' trust in public and political institutions is a key issue in the democratic system. Every public and political institution wants to ensure a higher level of citizens' trust in their institutions. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the pattern of citizens' trust in the public and political institutions of Nepal. This study identified several facets of institutional trust that could be valuable for the public and political institutions, as well as to governance in the public sector. Also, it will be relevant for public and political institutions to develop better strategies and initiatives in the coming days. Furthermore, it may be helpful to revisit governance approaches to improve citizens' trust. This research study has academic relevance in the governance and administration sector for further research and exploration. The study contributes to researchers interested in institutional trust. The result of this study gives new prominence and deeper reflections, and also provides a good application of statistical tools for robustness of analysis. Last but not least, the results of this study can be useful in the governance, administration, and service delivery training sessions

1.4 Scope of the Study

Data of the study have been taken from the Nepal National Governance Survey (NNGS) 2017/18. The survey was conducted by the Nepal Administrative Staff College with technical support from the Central Bureau of Statistics. This study uses the survey data to examine the patterns of citizens' trust in public and political institutions of Nepal by social-demographic characteristics and social associations and other variables.

1.5 Organization of the Study

The paper is organized into five chapters. This chapter covered the background of this study, purpose and research questions, rationale, and its scope. The second chapter contains a literature review, which is focused on the conceptualization of trust, forms of trust, citizens' trust and good governance, and the theoretical basis of trust. Chapter three covers the methodology of the study, and consists of the introduction of study data, study variables, data management, and analysis techniques. Chapter four contains data analysis and interpretation, and finally, chapter five presents the discussion and conclusion of the study.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter aims to review the literature on trust, which relates to and has an important link in the analysis and formulation of the concept of citizens' trust in public and political institutions. In particular, this section deals with and discusses the conceptualization and operationalization of trust, forms of trust, citizens' trust and good governance, and different theoretical basis of trust.

2.1 Conceptualization and Operationalization of Trust

The term trust is used regularly in our daily conversations, but there is no consensus on the exact meaning (Levi & Stoker, 2000). Although several studies have been conducted on trust issues around the world, there have never been commonly accepted definition. As per Blomqvist (1997), the universal definition of trust is not possible because trust is always an idea that is situation-specific. Scholars have diverse opinions on trust. According to Jamil and Askvik (2015), trust is a multidimensional concept and has different meanings. Trust is an elusive term for a complex and multifaceted concept (Feldheim & Wang, 2003; Grimmelikhuijsen, 2012). Trust refers to the willingness to depend on others to act on our behalf in the expectation that they can make effective decisions and to take our interests into account (Houston & Harding, 2014). Scholars like Rousseau et al. (1998) and Yang (2006) have defined trust as a psychological state. Trust is a psychological condition that includes the desire to recognize risk based on positive assumptions of the intent or actions of another trustee. There is also a group of scholars who have defined trust as performance and expectation. There is no question of trust when there are no issues of expectation and performance. According to Coleman (1990), trust is all about calculating the expectations of gain and loss. Putnam (1995) argued that trust is an important element of government performance. Trust affects institutional performance, well-being, economic development, and the reduction of crime (Marozzi, 2014). Trust in government is an assessment of whether or not the political authorities and institutions comply with the normative hopes of the citizens (Tolbert & Mossberger, 2006).

Trust is also defined as confidence. Trust can be defined as confidence in the goodwill of others and belief that they will not cause any harm to a person when he/she is vulnerable to it (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Citizens' trust is the degree to which citizens have confidence in duty holders' actions under institutional norms, desires, and preferences, as well as the extent to which they are fulfilled (Sztompka, 1999). Trust in government and public administration is the extent of confidence that people have in state institutions and administrative branches of different kinds (Vigoda-Gadot, 2006). Citizen trust in government can be measured by the degree to which citizens have confidence in public institutions to behave in the best interests of society and its residents (Kim, 2010). Trust in government is the confidence of citizens that the government operates under public interests and expectations. Institutions shape trust as they behave properly and honestly on behalf of the people (Barnes & Gill, 2000). Honesty, fairness, benevolence, and competence are four key qualities that a trusted government and public officials should possess (Yao, 2014). Rose-Ackerman (2001) argued that honesty is an essential substantive value with a close connection to trust. He further argued that trust is a response to honesty, and honesty includes both truth-telling and responsible actions aimed at obeying the rules. People were considered to be trustworthy, reflecting the characteristics of honesty, friendship with strong principles, and integrity (ibid. 648, cited in Mahmud, 2017). Honesty, fairness, benevolence, trustworthiness, commitment, and competence are important aspects of institutional trustworthiness (Kim, 2005). Enli and Rosenberg (2018) operationalized the concept of trust as honesty and realness. In the same vein as Rose-Ackerman, Kim, Enli and Rosenberg, NNGS 2017/18 also measured trust as honesty. This study also operationalized trust as honesty. Therefore, for this study, trust indicates the honesty of public and political institutions.

2.2 Forms of Trust

Different scholars have presented diverse forms of trust. Putnam (2000) presented two forms of trust namely generalized and particularized trust. Generalized trust occurs when most people trust, while particularized trust occurs when people trust their family members and friends (Putnam, 2000). A generalized trust exists where trust does not depend on the activities or characteristics of an individual or a single group (James & Sykuta, 2004). Particularized trust is maintained by people in certain specific individuals and individuals who are members of a specific group (James & Sykuta, 2004). Particularized thrusters do not keep trust in people who are not known to them (Uslaner, 2002). Rousseau et al., (1998) suggested three forms of trust, namely calculus-based trust, relational trust, and institutional trust. Calculus-based trust occurs when the trustor perceives that the trustee intends to take beneficial action. It is based on a rational choice and involves a cost-benefit analysis of economic exchange relations. Relational trust is the result of repeated interactions over time between truster and trustee (Rousseau et al., 1998). The basis for this trust is more emotional than cognitive (Lewis & Weigert, 1985). Institutional trust arises from the impersonal behavior of the trustee, and not from the recurrent interaction of emotions between parties such as a relational trust or based on financial benefits such as calculus-based trust

(Mahmud, 2017). The basis of this trust is the control mechanism, the legal framework, and clearly defined interaction roles of the parties (Oomsels & Bouckaert, 2012). Institutional trust in government requires public-spirited officials who are professional, competent, credible, and able to behave in the interests of the wider public (Kim, 2005).

2.3 Citizens' Trust and Good Governance

Citizens' trust in public and political institutions is a symbol of effective and effective governance, which is a foundation for good governance. Citizens' trust is considered both as a prerequisite for and as a result of good governance (Popovski, 2010; Yousaf, Ihsan, & Ellahi, 2016). Good governance confirms citizens' trust in public and political institutions. As per Blind (2010), trust in the government promotes good governance practices. Implementing good governance values in practice not only addresses the citizens' needs, but also increases citizen's trust in government (Yousaf, Ihsan, & Ellahi, 2016)). Essentially, good governance can only be achieved if the institutions have transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to the delivery system. Transparency, accountability, and responsiveness are a prerequisite for strengthening citizens' trust (Cheema, 2010; Armstrong, 2005). These factors directly and indirectly linked with trust.

Transparency is seen as a key gizmo for good governance and a condition for any democratic regime (Mabillard & Zumofen, 2017). Transparency means the free flow of information, and its availability to all those interested in decisions making (Saremi & Mohammadi, 2015). Transparency puts an end to secrecy, and improves citizen's trust, and moves towards good governance (Veal et al. 2011). If the government provides more information to the citizen, the level of trust would increase (Bannister & Connolly, 2011). Access to information to citizens is vital to accountability (Birkinshaw, 2006). The information available to the citizen is a crucial first step towards increased accountability (Gupta, 2018). Transparency, therefore, generates accountability (Fox, 2007), and accountability support to confirm good governance. This is because government accountability plays a key role in building citizens' trust in government (Yousaf, Ihsan, & Ellahi, 2016; Cheema 2010; Gordon: 2000). Lack of accountability indicates that there is little or no trust in the government.

In the case of responsiveness, Yousaf, Ihsan, and Ellahi (2016) argued that the governments' responsiveness is directly related to citizens' trust in government. This is because responsiveness satisfies the demands and needs of citizens (Gupta, 2018). Responsive governance is key to restoring trust in government (Brillantes & Fernandez, 2011). This is because the responsive actor has the merits of informing, listening, and responding. Distrust in government may arise if the government, and its officials do not respond to citizens' needs (Cheema, 2010). A responsive governance system is, therefore, needed to improve citizens' trust in government and to achieve good governance.

2.4 Theoretical Basis of Trust

2.4.1 Social Capital Theory

Social capital is defined as links between social networks, and the standards of mutuality and trustworthiness which arise from them (Putnam, 2000). The theory of social capital explained the notion of the trusted network (Fukuyama, 1995). This theory highlights the narrow and wider radius of trust. The narrow radius of trust indicates that a group of people trust only those close to them. People trust only those who are known personally. People trust only a limited number of people within their radius. This narrow radius of trust lessens the ability of the members of the group to trust outsiders. It is also associated with particularized trust while the wider radius is associated with a generalized trust, which is more or less similar to bonding and bridging suggested by Putnam (2000). Bonding social capital leads to particularized trust whereas bridging social capital leads to generalized trust. Generalized trust is high if there is higher social capital in public and political institutions. Generalized trust should be strong in the public and political institutions, it is said. If there is proof of strong generalized trust, citizens have high faith and confidence in the public and political institutions. Trust in public and political institutions increases when social capital is high. For example, if citizens go to public and political institutions to get a service without knowing the officials personally, and they don't have trouble, that means that citizens have high confidence. Based on the theory of social capital, it can be argued that increased social capital leads to more generalized trust, while low or declining social capital leads to the dominance of particularized trust. Public and political institutions should, therefore, accumulate higher social capital to ensure generalize trust. High levels of social capital are crucial to satisfying government performance and collective well-being, such as economic well-being and fewer social problems (Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995; Brehm & Rahn, 1997).

2.4.2 Rational Choice Theory

Rational choice theory is based on the idea of self-interested utility maximizes the actions/choices of individuals (Zey, 2001). Rational choice theorists believe that rational individuals make decisions and choices based on cognitive cost and benefit calculation (Cook & Santana, 2018). Rational individuals calculate the cost and benefits of public and political institutions' performance, if they find maximum utility or positive gain, then show trust in those institutions. Rational individuals trust only, if the expected gain from trusting, or the likelihood of gain minus the likelihood of loss is positive based on the expected utility-maximization assumption (Coleman, 1990). The individuals do not place his/her trust in public and political institutions without calculation. Individuals behave rationally when making decisions, and their choices are aimed at maximizing profit. Individuals have a preference among the options available where they pick their choices. If choice municipality office is preferred over option district administration office and option district administration office is preferred over option land revenue office, then municipality is preferred overland

revenue office. Individuals' choices are always based on the calculation of maximum utility. Individual calculate the performance of public and political institutions, If the expected performance is positive, then individuals show their trust. Public and political institutions should, therefore, perform their task effectively and efficiently with honesty to accumulate higher citizens' trust.

2.4.3 Integrative Model of Trust

Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) trust model, combining the trustees' assets, the trustees' characteristics, and the risk associated with the situation. The degree to which a person can trust another person is affected by the trustees' willingness to trust and the trustee's perception of the trustees' trustworthiness (Hung, Dennis & Robert, 2004). Trustworthiness is a function of the trustors' perceptions of the trustees' ability, benevolence, and integrity (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman 1995). Ability, as per Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995), is a group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that have an impact on a particular area. They defined benevolence as the extent to which a trustee is assumed to do good for the trustor. Benevolence proposes that the trustee has some definite attachment to the trustor, and is the insight of a positive orientation of the trustee toward the trustor. Integrity is the final element of trustworthiness, and is defined as the belief of the trustor that the trustee obeys a set of values that the trustor deems appropriate (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman 1995). These three factors of trustworthiness are important to trust. The trustee would be supposed fairly trustworthy if ability, benevolence, and honesty were all noticed to be high and strong. Along a continuum, each of the three variables will differ and catch some specific elements of trustworthiness. The Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995) trust model shows that human beings are very logical in decision-making, but only take risks if the dyadic trust is great.

Adopted from Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman (1995)




Figure 1: Integrative Model of Trust

2.4.4 Butlers' Trust Theory

Butler (1991) suggested ten comprehensive multidimensional conditions viz. availability, competency, consistency, discreetness, fairness, integrity, loyalty, openness, promise fulfillment, and receptivity for activating trust. These conditions denote the characteristics of a trustee who leads to trust. If the trustee includes these characteristics, the trustee will have trust in the trustee. To ensure trust in public and political institutions under this theory, these characteristics must be laid down by the duty holders. Successfully demonstrating these characteristics contributes to ensuring citizens' trust in public and political institutions.

CHAPTER III

STUDY METHOD

This chapter sets out the details of how the study was conducted and the reasons for the selection of the methods used. The chapter begins with study data, followed by study variables, data management, and analysis. Details are given as follows:

3.1 Study Data

The study is based on a quantitative approach. The quantitative data for this analysis was obtained from NNGS 2017/18. The NNGS 2017/18 is a citizen perception survey conducted by the Nepal Administrative Staff College in partnership with the Central Bureau of Statistics to generate evidence to lay the foundations for good governance in the context of ongoing political transformation in the country. The NNGS 2017/18 was primarily aimed at capturing the views of citizens about the different aspects of state governance. The NNGS 2017/18 is a nationally representative survey, carried out using four-stage multiple cluster sampling designs (districts, municipalities/rural municipalities, polling centers, individual levels), and selected 12920 individuals as samples across 43 districts of Nepal. For this, NNGS 2017/18 adopted a voting list prepared for the federal and provincial elections by the Nepal Election Commission in August 2017. After this, face-to-face interviews were conducted by trained and qualified research associates, among a representative sample of citizens aged 18 years and over, from December 2017 to March 2018. A total of 12872 interviews were completed satisfactorily, with a response rate of 99.6%. The reason for using the NNGS 2017/18 datasheet was that, it offers a broader set of predictor variables to examine citizens' trust in political and public institutions. This dataset provided comprehensive empirical evidence to examine the existing pattern of citizens' trust in public and political institutions.

3.2 Study Variables: Predictor and Outcomes

Several Predictor and Outcome variables are used to examine the pattern of citizens' trust in the public and political institutions of Nepal, as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Predictor and Outcome Variables

Out Come Variables		Predictor Variables	
Public Institution	Political Institution	Demographics	Social Associations
Courts, civil servants/ bureaucrats, local governments, civil society organizations, police and media	Ministries, political parties, parliamentarians,	Province, ecological zone , urban/rural, sex, age, education and economic status	Self-help groups, user groups, non-governmental organizations (NGO), political party, trade union, religious/ cultural organization, professional organizations/associations, ward citizen forum; citizen awareness centre, tole (neighborhood) committee and caste/ ethnic organizations

Source: NNGS, 2017/18

3.2.1 Outcome Variables

Citizens' trust in public and political institutions was the outcome variable of this study. The NNGS 2017/18 provided data for various public and political institutions, including ministries, political parties, parliamentarians, courts, civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, civil society organizations, police, and media (see Table 3.1 & 3.2). Citizens' trust in these institutions were used as outcome variables. The NNGS 2017/18 measures trust of citizens in public and political institutions in five responses viz. very honest, honest to some extent, not very honest, not honest at all and don't know/can't say. This study removed the 'don't know/can't say' response from the data analysis because this response does not give a clear-cut decision. After eliminating the 'don't know/can't say' response, the outcome variables became ordinal, and the ordinal regression was used. This study operationalized trust as honesty (see conceptualization of trust).

3.2.2 Predictor Variables

Several factors explain the differences in institutional trust (Dyrstad & Listhaug, 2013). In this regard, the demographics and social associations' indicators were taken as compulsory predictor variables for trust in all public and political institutions (see Table 3.1 & 3.2). Several specific indicators were also used for trust in public and political institutions as selective predictor variables (see Table 3.1). Some of the predictor variables also have 'don't know/can't say' answer; it was omitted from analysis, in the same way, as the outcome variables.

3.3 Data Management and Analysis

The NNGS 2017/18 dataset was available in SPSS format; therefore, the data analysis was carried out with the help of the SPSS version 26. This study used descriptive and inferential statistics. Mean and the standard deviation was used in descriptive statistics. Ordinal

regression was used in inferential statistics because the outcome variables were categorically ordered. Ordinal regression – a form of regression known as the "order logit model" is used with the ordinal outcome variable, where the predictor variables may be categorical factors or continuous covariates (Garson, 2014). The ordinal regression was used to model the relationship between the ordinal outcome variable, e.g., trust in public and political institutions, and predictor variables related to demographics, social associations, and others (see Table 3.2). The value of the outcome variables, citizens' trust in public and political institutions, was ordered by sorting in ascending order. The lowest value was defined in the first category. Various link functions are used in the ordinal regression analysis to build models. However, a logit link was used in this study because it is suitable for analyzing the ordered categorical data evenly distributed among all categories (Elamir & Sadeq, 2010). The logit link for the ordinal regression model was written as:

$$f[y_j(x)] = \log \left(\frac{r_j(x)}{1 - r_j(x)} \right) = \alpha + Bx_1 + Bx_2 + Bx_3 \dots, j = 1, 2, \dots, k - 1$$

Where, $f[y_j(x)]$ is logit link function; where 'j' indexes the cut-off points for all categories (k) of the outcome variable (dependent variables), B is regression coefficient, $x_1 + Bx_1 \dots$ are the predictor variables (independent variables). The classification and coding of predictor and outcome variables for ordinal regression analysis are presented in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Coding of Variables

Variables	Coding for Ordinal Regression Analysis
Predictor Variables: Demographics	
Q1=Province	1=0, 2=1, 3=2, 4=3, 5=4, 6=5 and 7=6
Q5=Ecological Zone	0=Mountain, 1=Hill and 2=Terai.
Q6=Urban/Rural	0=Municipality And 1=Rural Municipality
Q102=Sex	0=Male and 1=Female
Q104=Education Status	0=No Education, 1=No Formal Education, 2=Basic Education, 3=Secondary Education, and 4=Higher Education
	0=Rich, 1=Medium and 2=Poor
Predictor Variables: Social Associations	
Q501(1)=Self-Help Groups (Aama Samuha, Social Clubs, Etc.); Q501(2) User Groups (Groups Related To Forest or Other Development Activities); Q501(3) NGO; Q501(4)= Political Party; Q501(5)= Trade Union; Q501(6)= Religious/Cultural Organization; Q501(7)= Professional Organizations/Associations (Medical Association, Teacher Association, Cooperative Association, Farmer Association, Etc.); Q501(8)= Ward Citizen Forum; Q501(9)= Citizen Awareness Centre; Q501(10)= Tole (Neighborhood) Committee and Q501(11)= Caste/Ethnic Organizations	0=Yes and 1= No

Variables	Coding for Ordinal Regression Analysis
Predictor Variables: Others	
Q201=Vote in Election*; Q401= Knowledge of Constitution*; Q504= Discuss Politics/Current Affairs*; Q601= Knowledge of Political Party Activities*^; Q602= Political Party Represents Feelings*^; Q604(1)= Political Party Informs Decision and Activities*^; Q604(2)= Political Party Accountable*^; Q803= Media Effectively Informs Government Activities^; Q804(1)= Media Provide True Information^; Q1110(1)= Government Employees Follow Rules^; Q1110(2)= Government Employees Properly Listen to Concern Of Citizen^; Q1110(5)= Government Employees Provide Service in Time^; Q1110(6)= Government Employees Behave Friendly^; Q1110(7)= Government Employees Don't Create Hassel^; Q1202(1)= Local Government Ensure Participation in Planning and Development Activities•; Q1202(3)= Local Government Address Development Need Of Locality•; Q1202(8)= Local Government Control Corruption•; Q1303(1)= Police Take Immediately Action+; Q1303(2)= Police Don't Take Bribe+ and Q1303(4)= Police Treats People With Respect+	0=Yes and 1= No
Outcome Variables: Public Institutions	
Q701(2)=Local Government; Q701 (5)=Court; Q701 (6)=Civil Servants/Bureaucrats; Q701 (7)=Civil Society Organizations; Q701=(8) Police; Q701 (9)=Media; Q701 (11)=Users Group and Q701 (13)=Army	1=Not Honest At All, 2=Not Very Honest, 3=Honest to Some Extent and 4=Very Honest
Outcome Variables: Political Institutions	
Q701(1)=Ministers; Q701(3)=Political Parties and Q701(4)=Parliamentarians	1=Not Honest At All, 2=Not Very Honest, 3=Honest to Some Extent, and 4=Very Honest

Note:-1= Q refers to the question number used in NNGS 2017/18. 2=In addition to demographic and social association variables, these variables are used as predictor variables for Ministers, Parliamentarians*, Political Parties*^, Media^, Civil Servants and Bureaucrats^, Local Government• and Police +*

The SPSS software was used for data processing and statistical analysis. The generated data was compiled, tabulated, presented, and interpreted with relevant literature on citizen trust.

CHAPTER IV

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part discusses the level of citizens' trust in public and political institutions, and the second part discusses the impact of demographics, social associations, and other variables. The following are the details:

4.1 Citizens' Trust in Public and Political Institutions

The level of citizens' trust in public and political institutions is calculated using the means, which is presented in Table 4.1. There is a different level of citizens' trust in public and political institutions. Citizens have low levels of trust in political institutions, while they have higher trust in public institutions. Within the political institution, citizens have a low level of trust in ministers, political parties, and parliamentarians respectively. More or less similar kinds of results are also found in a survey of Nepali People (2018). As per this survey, political parties and federal and state parliaments are the least trusted institutions, with numbers ranging from 30 to 40 percent. The lowest citizens' trust in political institutions can be interpreted as a signal that ministers, political parties, and parliamentarians are not performing well. Citizens are not happy with their behavior, actions, and performance. Citizens have slightly more trust in public institutions, as opposed to political institutions. Some public institutions have attracted a relatively high level of citizens' trust, while others have a low level of trust. Public institutions such as the army and the media have a higher level of citizens' trust, while police and civil servants /bureaucrats have a lower level of citizens' trust. This shows that citizens are more satisfied with the performance/actions of the army and the media compared to the police and civil servants/bureaucrats. To accumulate a higher level of citizens' trust, these public and political institutions must satisfy the needs and expectations of the citizen through high levels of performance at all levels and at any cost.

Table 4.1 Level of Citizens' Trust in Public and Political Institutions

Variables	N*	Mean**	SD
Public Institutions			
Police	12228	2.5804	.85995
Civil Servants/Bureaucrats	12297	2.6087	.79098
Court	10591	2.8533	.85524
User Group	11786	2.8669	.72732
Local Governments	11928	2.9172	.74311
Civil Society Organizations	10876	2.9359	.65561
Media	11775	3.0573	.67158
Army	11611	3.2741	.71588
Political Institutions			
Ministers	11491	2.2767	.86464
Political Parties	11971	2.3315	.80820
Parliamentarians	11142	2.3586	.82727

*There is variation in the number of responses because 'don't know/can't say' responses were removed.

**Minimum value is 1 and maximum value is 4.

4.2 Citizens' Trust in Police and Army

An ordered logit model was used to examine the effect of demographics, social associations, and other variables on trust in police and the army. Province, ecological zone, urban/rural, age, sex, education, and economic status were taken as demographic predictors and members/involvement in self-help groups, user groups, NGOs, political party, trade union, religious/cultural organization, professional organizations, ward citizen forum, citizen awareness center, tole committee and caste/ethnic organizations were taken as social association predictor variables, and trust in police and army were used as an outcome variable. Table 4.2 presents the results of the ordinal regression which showing coefficient and odd ratio/EXP(B) for citizens' trust in the police and the army. Positive coefficient and more than 1 odd ratio for predictor variables indicate positive effects on outcome variables and vice versa.

The study result showed that citizens have a positive as well as a negative perception of trust in the police and army, and is differed by demographic, social associations, and other factors at the micro-level. The citizens of Bagmati, Lumbini, and Karnali have positive trust in the police and the army. This situation is entirely different for Province 1 and Province 2. Province 1 citizens have positive trust in the police and negative trust in the army, but Province 2 citizens have positive trust in the army and negative trust in the police. A positive coefficient for mountains and hills has been observed by the ecological zone, but only the hill is evident as significant. Citizens of the hill, compared to Terai, have a significantly positive trust in the police and the army. Although the difference is large for urban/rural, it is not reported as significant. The municipality is negatively associated to trust in the police and the army. This points out that the citizen of the rural municipality has more trust in the police and the army than the municipality.

Table 4.2 Citizens' Trust in Police and Army

Predictors	Police			Army		
	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.
Demographics						
Age	.000	1.000	.945	.006	1.006	.000
Province 1	.368	1.445	.000	-.277	0.758	.000
Province 2	-.270	0.763	.001	1.396	4.039	.000
Bagmati	.015	1.015	.855	.214	1.239	.008
Gandaki	-.171	0.843	.054	-.157	0.855	.070
Lumbini	.148	1.160	.074	.188	1.207	.021
Karnali	.162	1.176	.066	.567	1.763	.000
Sudurpashchim (Ref.)						
Mountain	.050	1.051	.516	.036	1.037	.630
Hill	.409	1.505	.000	.343	1.409	.000
Terai (Ref.)						
Municipality	-.076	0.927	.069	-.077	0.926	.062
Rural Municipality (Ref.)						
Male	-.049	0.952	.300	.406	1.501	.000
Female (Ref.)						
No Education	.106	1.112	.167	-.169	0.845	.029
No Formal Education	.114	1.121	.128	-.040	0.961	.595
Basic Education	.015	1.015	.848	-.097	0.908	.217
Secondary Education	.062	1.064	.428	-.050	0.951	.527
Higher Education (Ref.)						
Rich	-.071	0.931	.680	-.187	0.829	.291
Medium	-.009	0.991	.832	.011	1.011	.807
Poor (Ref.)						
Social Associations						
Self Help Groups	.027	1.027	.575	.088	1.092	.071
User Groups	-.017	0.983	.768	.091	1.095	.101
NGOs	.028	1.028	.716	.066	1.068	.389
Political Party	-.014	0.986	.848	.039	1.040	.599
Trade Union	-.073	0.930	.715	.142	1.153	.481
Religious/Cultural Organization	.094	1.099	.227	.227	1.255	.003
Professional Organizations	-.018	0.982	.826	.057	1.059	.485
Ward Citizen Forum	.100	1.105	.384	.072	1.075	.541
Citizen Awareness Centre	-.024	0.976	.868	.090	1.094	.545
Tole Committee	-.104	0.901	.119	.057	1.059	.390
Caste/Ethnic Organizations	.037	1.038	.682	-.019	0.981	.830
Others						
Police Treat with Respect	.788	2.199	.000	-	-	-
Police Don't Tale Bribe	.944	2.570	.000	-	-	-
Police Take Immediate Action	.539	1.714	.000	-	-	-

A negative coefficient for the police and a significantly positive coefficient for the army are observed by sex. This revealed that sex has a significant positive impact on trust in the army, indicating that, men have positive trust in the army compared to women. A significant positive coefficient observed for age, suggesting a positive association between age and trust. The coefficient for the police and army is .000 and .006, respectively, indicating that

the ordered log-odds increase by .000 and .006 for each unit of increase in age. As the age increases, trust in the army increases, but for the police, is constant. Surprising results have been found for education. The effects of education are large, but not significant. Positive coefficients are observed for the police and negative for the army. This indicates that education has a positive effect on police and negative on the army. Economic status has also an effect on the trust in the police and the army, but not significant. Economic status has a negative effect on police trust. As economic status increases (moving poor to rich), trust in the police is declining. But in the case of the army, compared to the poor, the rich have negative trust, but the middle income has slightly more positive trust in the army.

Social associations are other determinants of trust in the police and army. None of the 11 predictors are significantly associated with police and army trust. All social associations are positively associated with trust in the army except caste/ethnic organizations, suggesting that they have more trust in the army. This scenario is different for the police. Citizens who are members of user groups, political parties, trade unions, professional organizations, citizen awareness centers, and caste/ethnic organizations have shown negative coefficients, indicating that they are negatively associated with trust in the police. It means that citizens, who are members of this social association, have a negative trust than those who do not. The police treat with respect, the police do not take bribes, and the police take prompt action, which has significant positive effects on trust in the police. It indicates that those citizens who believe police take appropriate action when reporting or telling crime or incident, police do not take a bribe, and treat people with dignity, are more likely to trust in police than those who do not.

4.3 Citizens' Trust in Civil Society, User Group, and Media

Table 4.3 presents the results of the ordinal regression model for citizens' trust in civil society, user groups, and the media. There are some notable results. Evidence has shown that demographic, social associations and other variables have a mixed impact (positive and negative) on trust in civil society, user groups, and media. The positive coefficient of trust in civil society, user group, and media (except Bagmati) are observed for all provinces. This suggests that citizens of all provinces (except Bagmati) have more trust in civil society, user groups, and media, but the level of trust within the province is varied. Compared to Sudurpashchim, a higher level of positive trust in civil society is observed in Karnali, Province 1, Lumbini, Gandaki, Province 2, and Bagmati (not evident as significant). However, in the case of trust in the user group, this scenario is different. Higher positive trust in the user group is observed for Gandaki, Lumbini, Province 1, Karnali, Province 2, and Bagmati (not evident as significant) respectively. Similarly, in the case of media trust, higher positive trust is observed for Karnali, Province 2, Lumbini, Province 1, and Gandaki, respectively (not evident as significant), and negative trust for Bagmati (not evident as significant).

Trust in civil society, user groups, and media are positively associated with the ecological zone, but statistical significance is only observed for hills. Citizens of the hills, compared to Terai, have significant positive trust in civil society, user groups, and media. As for urban/

rural, the difference is large, but it does not appear to be significant. The municipality is negatively associated to trust in civil society and user groups, and positive for media. This suggests that municipal citizens have negative trust in civil society and user group, and has positive trust in media. Sex has a large but not significant effect on trust in the user group, media, and civil society. A negative association between sex (men) and trust in user group and media, and positive for civil society are observed. Compared to women, men have negative trust in user groups and media, and have positive trust in civil society. Age and trust civil society, user group, and media are positively associated, but only the user group is shown to be significant. Civil society, user group, and media coefficients are .002, .005 and .003 respectively, meaning that the ordered log-odds are increasing by .002, .005 and .003 for each unit of increase in age. As age increases, trust in civil society, user groups, and media increases.

Educational effects are massive, but they are not significant. In comparison to higher education, higher trust in civil society is observed for no education, basic education, formal education, and secondary education respectively, but this scenario is different in the case of trust in the user group. Higher trust in the user group is observed for secondary education, basic education, no education, and formal education respectively. The media trust is observed as mixed (positive and negative) results. Positive trust is observed for no education and secondary education, while negative for no formal education and basic education. It suggests that citizens of higher education have marginally more trust in media than no formal education and basic education, but that compared to no education, secondary education has less trust. Economic status and trust in civil society, user groups, and media are negatively associated, but are only significantly associated with the media. Trust is declining as the economic status (moving poor to rich) increases.

Social associations are further determinants of trust in civil society, user groups, and media. Out of 11 predictors, none of the predictors are significantly associated to trust in civil society. Except for a member of the trade union, all social associations produce positive coefficients, indicating that there is a higher level of citizens' trust among the citizens who are members of these social associations. However, except for three predictors (self-help group, user group, and political party), none of them have produced significant results. The negative coefficients produced by NGOs, political parties, and trade unions indicate that the citizens who are members of these social associations, have negative trust in the user group. In the case of the media, three predictors (self-user group, political party, and religious/cultural organization) have produced significant results. Citizens who are members of the political party, the trade union and the tole committee have negative trust in the media. Media effectively informs government activities and media provide true information that has a significant positive effect on media trust. It means that citizens, who believed media efficiently informing citizens about government activities and media providing accurate information, have more trust in media that don't.

Table 4.3 Citizens' Trust in Civil Society, User Group, and Media

Predictors	Civil Society			User Group			Media		
	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.
Demographics									
Age	.002	1.002	.277	.005	1.005	.004	.003	1.003	.050
Province 1	.811	2.250	.000	.758	2.134	.000	.247	1.280	.003
Province 2	.469	1.598	.000	.285	1.330	.001	.478	1.613	.000
Bagmati	.164	1.178	.076	.080	1.083	.342	-.018	0.982	.842
Gandaki	.657	1.929	.000	1.001	2.721	.000	.078	1.081	.394
Lumbini	.790	2.203	.000	.868	2.382	.000	.337	1.401	.000
Karnali	.843	2.323	.000	.503	1.654	.000	.612	1.844	.000
Sudurpashchim (Ref.)									
Mountain	.139	1.149	.107	.128	1.137	.097	.112	1.119	.172
Hill	.664	1.943	.000	.614	1.848	.000	.656	1.927	.000
Terai (Ref.)									
Municipality	-.071	0.931	.130	-.091	0.913	.033	.015	1.015	.738
Rural Municipality (Ref.)									
Male	.125	1.133	.019	-.074	0.929	.127	-.103	0.902	.044
Female (Ref.)									
No Education	.133	1.142	.122	.099	1.104	.211	.108	1.114	.188
No Formal Education	.070	1.073	.402	.043	1.044	.581	-.061	0.941	.446
Basic Education	.108	1.114	.211	.135	1.145	.096	-.011	0.989	.894
Secondary Education	.030	1.030	.732	.182	1.200	.026	.052	1.053	.526
Higher Education (Ref.)									
Rich	-.235	0.791	.214	-.341	0.711	.055	-.647	0.524	.001
Medium	-.031	0.969	.544	-.062	0.940	.173	-.136	0.873	.005
Poor (Ref.)									
Social Associations									
Self Help Groups	.078	1.081	.153	.196	1.217	.000	.154	1.166	.003
User Groups	.152	1.164	.015	.503	1.654	.000	.060	1.062	.309
NGOs	.193	1.213	.020	-.091	0.913	.240	.070	1.073	.376
Political Party	.006	1.006	.936	-.306	0.736	.000	-.243	0.784	.002
Trade Union	-.081	0.922	.709	-.265	0.767	.193	-.219	0.803	.286
Religious/Cultural	.090	1.094	.293	.060	1.062	.449	.188	1.207	.022
Organization	.077	1.080	.396	.165	1.179	.049	.001	1.001	.992
Professional Organizations	.132	1.141	.289	.018	1.018	.877	.065	1.067	.592
Ward Citizen Forum	.235	1.265	.137	.310	1.363	.038	.220	1.246	.147
Citizen Awareness Centre	.132	1.141	.070	.089	1.093	.191	-.002	0.998	.972
Tole Committee	.363	1.438	.000	.076	1.079	.407	.122	1.130	.196
Caste/Ethnic Organizations									
Others									
Media Effectively Inform	-	-	-	-	-	-	.744	2.104	.000
Media Provide True Information	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.438	4.212	.000

4.4 Citizens' Trust in Civil Servants, Local Government, and Court

Table 4.4 presents the results of the ordinal regression for the trust of citizens in civil servants/bureaucrats, local government, and court. The estimated coefficient and odds ratio/EXP (B) showed remarkable and interesting results. Citizens' trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts vary according to demographics, social associations, and other variables with or without statistical significance. The positive coefficient is observed for all provinces for trust in civil servants/bureaucrats (except for Province 2), local governments, and courts. This indicates that citizens of all provinces have more trust in civil servants/bureaucrats (except for Province 2), local governments, and courts, but the level of trust varies across provinces with or without statistical significance.

Trust in local governments, courts, and civil servants/bureaucrats (negative to the mountains) are positively associated with the ecological zone, but the only hill has a significant coefficient. Citizens of the hills, compared to Terai, have significant positive trust in civil servants, local governments, and courts. Urban/rural and trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts are not significantly associated. Negative coefficients for local governments and courts, and positive for civil servants/bureaucrats have been observed. This indicates that the citizens of the municipality have negative trust in the local governments and courts, and have positive trust in servants/bureaucrats. The effect of sex on trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts are huge, but significant only observed for civil servants. It is found that there is a negative association between sex (men) and trust in civil servants/bureaucrats and courts, and positive for local governments. Compared to women, men have negative trust in civil servants/bureaucrats and courts, and have positive trust in local governments. Both negative and positive coefficients are observed for age, but not as evident as significant. The coefficient for civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts are $-.005$, $-.001$, and $.001$, respectively, indicating that the ordered log-odds decreased by $.005$ and $.001$, and increased by $.001$ for each unit of increase in age. As age increases, trust in servants/bureaucrats and local governments are decreased, and increased in courts.

Educational effects are massive, but not significant. Statistical significance is only seen for trust in civil servants/bureaucrats and no education in the local governments. Trust and education are negatively associated, even the coefficient is positive. The coefficient and the odd ratio of education are increasing with declining educational attainment. This shows that, compared to higher education, citizens with no education and lower levels of education have more trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts. However, as opposed to higher education, citizens with secondary education have low trust in courts. This shows that higher education citizens have more trust in courts than in secondary education, but as compare to no education, no formal education, and basic education, have lower trust. A higher education citizens have a higher level of knowledge about the governance system, and critically assess the performance of institutions. Economic status is not significantly associated with trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts. Economic status has negative effects on local governments' trust. As economic status

(moving poor to rich) increases, trust in local governments is declining. Rich citizens have low trust in local governments. But in courts, compared to the poor, the rich citizens have negative trust, but the middle-income citizens have positive trust. Middle and rich citizens have more trust in civil servants/bureaucrats than the poor.

Social associations are other important determinants of trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts. Trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts also vary with social associations. Social associations are not a good predictor of trust in civil servants/ bureaucrats, local governments, and courts. None of the 11 predictors are significantly associated. NGOs, political parties, professional organizations, and ward citizen forums have negative coefficients of trust in civil servants/bureaucrats. Similarly, political parties, trade unions, religious/cultural organizations, professional organizations, and ward citizen forums have negative coefficients for local governments, and NGOs, political parties, and professional organizations have negative coefficients for the courts. This indicates that citizens who are members of such social groups have low trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, local governments, and courts. Compliance, listening, serving in time, and creating no difficulties have a significant positive effect on the trust of civil servants/ bureaucrats. This suggests that citizens, who believed that government employees obey the laws, respond to service user complaints, deliver service promptly, and do not create trouble/problems, have high trust in civil servants/bureaucrats. Voting in the election and knowledge constitution does not have a significant positive effect on local governments' trust, while discussing current policy issues, ensuring participation in development planning, addressing development needs, and controlling corruption, have a significant positive effect on local governments trust. This shows that citizens who discuss politics, current affairs/ events with family/friends/colleagues and believe that local governments ensure citizens' participation in the planning/development process, address local development needs, and control corruption, have more positive trust in local governments.

Table 4.4 Citizens' Trust in Civil Servants, Local Government, and Court

Predictors	Civil Servants			Local Government			Court		
	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.
Demographics									
Age	-.005	0.995	.015	-.001	0.999	.645	.001	1.001	.721
Province 1	.443	1.557	.000	.576	1.779	.000	.665	1.944	.000
Province 2	-.588	0.555	.000	.578	1.782	.000	.053	1.054	.530
Bagmati	.013	1.013	.906	.300	1.350	.002	.218	1.244	.010
Gandaki	.323	1.381	.005	.510	1.665	.000	.029	1.029	.752
Lumbini	.147	1.158	.182	.492	1.636	.000	.708	2.030	.000
Karnali	.596	1.815	.000	.766	2.151	.000	.778	2.177	.000
Sudurpashchim (Ref.)									
Mountain	-.145	0.865	.149	.153	1.165	.083	.097	1.102	.213
Hill	.356	1.428	.000	.500	1.649	.000	.549	1.732	.000
Terai (Ref.)									
Municipality	.051	1.052	.353	-.109	0.897	.029	-.032	0.969	.442
Rural Municipality (Ref.)									
Male	-.226	0.798	.000	.070	1.073	.225	-.120	0.887	.011
Female (Ref.)									
No Education	.311	1.365	.002	.273	1.314	.003	.145	1.156	.060
No Formal Education	.081	1.084	.392	.224	1.251	.010	.079	1.082	.293
Basic Education	.048	1.049	.623	.225	1.252	.011	-.032	0.969	.676
Secondary Education	.036	1.037	.708	.021	1.021	.808	.050	1.051	.520
Higher Education (Ref.)									
Rich	.038	1.039	.872	-.125	0.882	.557	-.369	0.691	.028
Medium	.077	1.080	.199	-.104	0.901	.054	.009	1.009	.837
Poor (Ref.)									
Social Associations									
Self Help Groups	.007	1.007	.905	.111	1.117	.054	.171	1.186	.001
User Groups	.024	1.024	.734	.160	1.174	.010	.043	1.044	.450
NGOs	-.078	0.925	.407	.066	1.068	.435	-.113	0.893	.137
Political Party	-.126	0.882	.166	-.026	0.974	.749	-.196	0.822	.008
Trade Union	.043	1.044	.852	-.260	0.771	.213	.190	1.209	.340
Religious/Cultural	.051	1.052	.590	-.104	0.901	.220	.161	1.175	.036
Organization	-.119	0.888	.227	-.072	0.931	.419	-.186	0.830	.022
Professional Organizations	-.076	0.927	.584	-.024	0.976	.845	.016	1.016	.887
Ward Citizen Forum	.118	1.125	.501	.323	1.381	.040	.242	1.274	.099
Citizen Awareness Centre	.014	1.014	.867	.063	1.065	.387	.030	1.030	.657
Tole Committee	.210	1.234	.058	.159	1.172	.103	.052	1.053	.557
Caste/Ethnic Organizations									
Others									
Compliance	.805	2.237	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Listening	.498	1.645	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Time	.264	1.302	.001	-	-	-	-	-	-
Behave in Friendly Manner	.197	1.218	.015	-	-	-	-	-	-
Creates No Hassle	.563	1.756	.000	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vote in Election	-	-	-	-.027	0.973	.792	-	-	-
Knowledge Constitution	-	-	-	-.022	0.978	.709	-	-	-
Discuss Politics Current Affair	-	-	-	.278	1.320	.000	-	-	-
Ensure Participation	-	-	-	.882	2.416	.000	-	-	-
Address Development Need	-	-	-	.818	2.266	.000	-	-	-
Control Corruption	-	-	-	.504	1.655	.000	-	-	-

4.5 Citizens' Trust in Ministers, Parliamentarians, and Political Parties

Table 4.5 presents the estimated coefficient and odds ratio/EXP (B) of the ordinal regression model for citizens' political institutions. Several remarkable results are found. Evidence has shown that demographics, social associations, and other factors have played an important role in determining the negative and positive perception of citizens' trust in political institutions. Citizens' trust in political institutions varies with demographics, social associations, and other variables at the micro-level. There is a difference in the trust of citizens in political institutions. The negative coefficient for Bagmati and Gandaki has been observed. This indicates that the citizens of Bagmati and Gandaki have negative trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties. Citizens of Province 2 have negative trust in ministers and parliamentarians, but positive trust in the political parties which is also confirmed by the models' $[\text{Exp}(\beta)]$. Citizens of Province 1, Lumbini, and Karnali have positive trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties than Sudurpashchim. It is interesting to note that Province 1, Lumbini, and Karnali for ministers, and Province 1, Bagmati, Lumbini, and Karnali for parliamentarians, and only Bagmati for the political party, appear to be significant.

Ecological zone and trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties are positively associated with or without statistical significance. Hill has shown a significant positive coefficient of trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties. This indicates that, compared to Terai, the citizen of the hill has positive trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties. Mountain also showed positive coefficients for ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties, but only ministers appear to be significant. As hill citizens, mountain citizens also have significant positive trust in ministers. Urban / rural is positively as well as negatively associated with trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties. The municipality has a negative coefficient for ministers and parliamentarians, and a positive for political parties, but only parliamentarians evident as significant. This indicates that compared to the rural municipality; municipal citizens have negative trust in ministers and parliamentarians, and positive trust in the political parties.

A significantly negative association is identified between sex (men) and trust in ministers and parliamentarians. The sex coefficients (men) are -0.196 and -.197 for ministers and parliamentarians, respectively, indicating that men have significantly negative trust compared to women. Age and trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties are not significantly associated. A negative coefficient is observed for age, which suggests that there is a negative association between age and trust. The coefficient for ministers and political parties are -.002 and -.001 respectively, indicating that the ordered log-odds decrease by 0.02 and 0.01 for each unit of increase in age. Young age groups are associated with higher levels of trust. Trust decreases with age increases.

Although the coefficient is positive, trust and education are negatively associated. Statistical significance is seen for all, except for the political party, but within the political party, no education is evident as significant. The coefficient and odd ratio of education decreased with

an increase in educational attainment. This shows that citizens with no education and lower level of education have more trust than those with higher education. However, in the case of political parties' trust, compared to higher education, citizens with secondary education have less trust. This indicates that higher education citizens have slightly more trust in the political parties than secondary education, but that compared to no education, formal education, and basic education, citizens have less trust. It indicated that higher-educated citizens have less trust than those with less education. It is because higher education, however, may induce more critical attitudes towards political institutions, hence declines trust with educational levels (Krishnaswamy & Swaminathan, 2019). When citizens become more informed, their government performance expectations increase, and if citizens' expectations increase faster than governments' actual performance, trust and satisfaction may decline (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013). Economic status has a negative effect on trust but does not appear to be significant. Trust is declining as the economic status (moving poor to rich) increasing. Rich citizens have low trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties than poor citizens.

Social associations are important predictors of trust in political institutions. Out of 11 predictors, none of the predictors are significantly associated with trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties. Citizens who are members of user groups, NGOs, and professional organizations have negative trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties. The citizens who are a member of political parties, trade union, and tole committee have negative trust in ministers, but have positive trust in both parliamentarians and political parties. Similarly, citizens who are members of caste/ethnic organizations have negative trust in political parties, but are positive for ministers and parliamentarians. Voting in an election does not have a significant negative effect on the trust in ministers, parliamentarians, and political parties. Similarly, knowledge of the constitution does not have a significant negative effect on the political parties' trust, but has a significant positive effect on the trust of ministers and parliamentarians. It shows that citizens who know the constitution have a positive trust in ministers and parliamentarians. The political parties represent the feeling and are accountable to have a significant positive effect on the political parties' trust. This evidence shows that citizens who believed that political parties represent their feelings and are accountable have more positive trust in the political parties than those who do not.

Table 4.5 Citizens' Trust in Ministers, Parliamentarians and Political Parties

Predictors	Ministers			Parliamentarians			Political Parties		
	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.	Estimate	EXP (B)	Sig.
Demographics									
Age	-.002	0.998	.342	.000	1.000	.924	-.001	0.999	.674
Province 1	.543	1.721	.000	.396	1.486	.000	.325	1.384	.030
Province 2	-.057	0.945	.545	-.206	0.814	.033	.409	1.505	.052
Bagmati	-.136	0.873	.115	-.471	0.624	.000	-.855	0.425	.000
Gandaki	-.052	0.949	.570	-.092	0.912	.325	-.231	0.794	.144
Lumbini	.471	1.602	.000	.263	1.301	.004	.229	1.257	.168
Karnali	.475	1.608	.000	.452	1.571	.000	.206	1.229	.270
Sudurpashchim (Ref.)									
Mountain	.350	1.419	.000	.108	1.114	.190	.194	1.214	.197
Hill	.546	1.726	.000	.392	1.480	.000	.347	1.415	.001
Terai (Ref.)									
Municipality	-.086	0.918	.056	-.136	0.873	.003	.087	1.091	.296
Rural Municipality (Ref.)									
Male	-.196	0.822	.000	-.197	0.821	.000	-.062	0.940	.529
Female (Ref.)									
No Education	.798	2.221	.000	.664	1.943	.000	.565	1.759	.000
No Formal Education	.625	1.868	.000	.484	1.623	.000	.339	1.404	.012
Basic Education	.357	1.429	.000	.386	1.471	.000	.141	1.151	.290
Secondary Education	.249	1.283	.001	.234	1.264	.003	-.118	0.889	.358
Higher Education (Ref.)									
Rich	-.310	0.733	.091	-.353	0.703	.053	-.193	0.824	.538
Medium	.008	1.008	.869	.090	1.094	.075	-.056	0.946	.554
Poor (Ref.)									
Social Associations									
Self Help Groups	.090	1.094	.084	.034	1.035	.530	.270	1.310	.006
User Groups	-.016	0.984	.776	-.049	0.952	.403	-.276	0.759	.007
NGOs	-.150	0.861	.050	-.120	0.887	.126	-.157	0.855	.251
Political Party	-.058	0.944	.413	.075	1.078	.306	.132	1.141	.236
Trade Union	-.251	0.778	.186	.328	1.388	.093	.154	1.166	.597
Religious/Cultural Organization	.001	1.001	.991	.058	1.060	.458	.042	1.043	.745
Professional Organizations	-.124	0.883	.117	-.155	0.856	.058	-.047	0.954	.719
Ward Citizen Forum	.054	1.055	.625	.115	1.122	.315	.474	1.606	.010
Citizen Awareness Centre	.192	1.212	.181	.285	1.330	.058	.148	1.160	.507
Tole Committee	-.069	0.933	.294	.138	1.148	.042	.182	1.200	.119
Caste/Ethnic Organizations	.065	1.067	.461	.164	1.178	.071	-.147	0.863	.316
Others									
Vote in Election	-.048	0.953	.598	-.011	0.989	.904	-.013	0.987	.942
Knowledge of Constitution	.268	1.307	.000	.407	1.502	.000	-.016	0.984	.894
Discuss Politics/Current Affairs	.041	1.042	.447	.140	1.150	.011	.020	1.020	.870
Political Party Represent Feeling	-	-	-	-	-	-	.786	2.195	.000
Political Party Inform Decision	-	-	-	-	-	-	.164	1.178	.189
Accountable Political Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	.764	2.147	.000

CHAPTER V

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Discussions and conclusions are presented in this section, which is as follows:

5.1 Discussion

Over the years, citizens' trust in public and political institutions has been a frequent subject of interest to literature. Public and political institutions are power-centric bodies of the state that work for national welfare. The citizens' trust in these institutions is regarded as a crucial component of a functioning healthy democracy in the nation. Citizens' trust is an integral part of a broader measure of legitimacy (Bradford, Jackson, & Hough, 2017). The loss of citizens' trust in public and political institutions is more worrying for the legitimacy of a democratic system. Legitimacy can be achieved through an effective and efficient performance at these institutions. Mishler and Rose (2001) argued that institutional trust is an expected utility of satisfactorily performing institutions. Scholars such as March (1988), North (1990), Hetherington (1998), Newton and Norris (2000) argued that institutional trust is a consequence of institutional performance. Citizens' trust, therefore, depends on the performance of the institutions. If institutions want to accumulate more trust among citizens, they must perform effectively and efficiently. Citizens have a high level of trust if they believe that institutions are performing well. Institutions must respond and satisfy citizens' concerns and needs. Citizens assess the performance and quality of institutions, on that basis, decides to trust and distrust. Citizen satisfaction with the performance of these institutions is an essential precondition for gaining and maintaining trust. Most of all, public and political institutions are trying to accumulate higher citizens' trust worldwide, and Nepal is no exception. Evidence, however, has shown that there is not satisfactorily citizens' trust. Citizens' trust in political institutions is quite low compared to public institutions. Citizens are not satisfied with the performance of political institutions. In public institutions, police and civil servants/bureaucrats are the least trusted whereas the army and media are the most trusted public institution among citizens. The level of trust of citizens in these public and political institutions varies with demographics, social associations, and other variables. Detail discussions are as follows:

5.1.1 Police

Nepal Police is security providing public institution for the prevention and investigation of crime and the enforcement and maintenance of law and order for a peaceful and secure society. The vision of the Nepal Police is a people-oriented, fair, and professional police service. Professional competence, courage, integrity, respect for the law, respect for people, fairness, compassion, loyalty, commitment, and hard work are the core values of the Nepal Police. Nepal Police provides its services based on these core principles. Nepal Police is committed to fostering a relationship of mutual trust, cooperation, and respect for the public (Nepal Police, 2015). Nepal Police is committed to protecting basic citizens' rights to establish a healthy, law-abiding culture that values lawful assembly and demonstrations (Nepal Police, 2014). As per the Nepal Police Regulation (2014), police employees are expected to conduct their duties honestly and readily. The legislation also provides for penalties in the event of incompetence, moral decline, corruption, failure to maintain order, incapacity to meet positional duty, harassment of service users, unsatisfactory performance, and so on.

To ensure citizens' satisfaction by demonstrating effective and efficient service, time to time, the Nepal Police has taken several initiatives, such as door-to-door program, community policing centers, women and children service center, working together with the community, delivering service with a smile, citizens help desk, community-police partnership, a public audit of police works through public hearing programs, and so on. Given these efforts, the degree of citizens' trust in the Nepal Police was found to be very low compared with other public institutions (see Table 4.1). Many citizens of Nepal have negative views, and are openly criticized, and feel unsafe despite the security job being done by them. The police fail to make the public know that police are their friends, and not evil. Citizens saw police as a symbol of power, and believe police use that power for brutality and street-level corruption. Diminishing police trust has negative implications for successful policing in Nepal. The police themselves is the most significant element in assessing public attitudes (Gourley, 1954, as cited in Thornton, 1975). If the police do their job successfully, they win the trust of the citizens (Kääriäinen, 2008). Citizens' trust in police is a major implication for quality policing. Citizens' trust in police is an important policing performance measure (Alda, Bennett & Morabito, 2017; Moore, 2002; Morris: 2014). Gaining citizens' trust in the Nepal Police is, therefore, essential. Nepali Citizens want police should act and do their job with equality, honesty, the dignity of character, justice, fairness, loyalty, and professionalism. If the police work with these values, the police accumulate higher citizens' trust. Nepali Police actually claim to be working with these values, but in practice, many Nepali citizens are not trusting, and are being publicly criticized. Maintaining and ensuring citizens' trust in police is the backbone of effective policing and law enforcement. According to Fleming and McLaughlin (2010), citizen trust has in the police is a significant measure of government institutions' legitimacy. Accumulation of citizens' trust is, therefore, a primary prerequisite for maintaining and strengthening democracy in a nation.

5.1.2 Nepal Army

The Nepal Army is the most admired public institution. Evidence has shown that the Nepal Army is one of the most trusted public institutions in Nepal. Compared to other public and political institutions, the Nepal Army has gained the highest level of citizens' trust (see Table 4.1). As per the survey of Nepali People (2018), the majority (87.7%) of respondents expressed their trust in the Nepal Army. It is rare to hear that Nepal Army is openly being criticized. It is also true that the army cannot survive in a democracy without the support of the general public (Malešič & Garb, 2018). Nepali citizens believe that the Nepal Army acts with commitment, professionalism, honesty, integrity, sincerity, and self-sacrifice in the sole interest of serving the nation and its citizens. Nepal Army, as defined by the Nepal Constitution (2015), has shown a strong commitment to safeguarding the country's sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and national unity. Similarly, under the provisions of the Constitution, the Nepal Army also actively engaged in development, construction, and disaster management work. The involvement of the Nepal Army in a challenging and risky development project and the successful completion of these projects promptly helped to accumulate higher citizens' trust. If there is a major national development project, it is generally heard by citizens to give this project to the Nepal Army. This shows how much Nepali citizens trust the Nepal Army. The Nepal Army has also shown a strong commitment to the rescue of people in the event of a natural disaster. During a natural disaster, the Nepal Army, without thinking about their own lives, rescues the people. Due to this wonderful work, Nepali citizens have a high level of trust in the Nepal Army. Similarly, enhancing Nepal's image in the global community, providing assistance in disaster relief operations, building roads in difficult/risky areas, protecting national parks, and conservation areas have contributed to accumulate higher citizens' trust in the Nepal Army. The Nepal Army has received public acceptance and support.

5.1.3 Civil Society

Over the last two decades, civil society (Nagarik Samaj) has evolved, and is flourishing significantly (World Economic Forum, 2013), and regarded as the third sector of society. As per Bhatta (2007), civil society is not a political one; it is a non-state but not an anti-state and anti-people society. Also, he argued that its non-state functions cover both social and political activities. Civil society is, in fact, an independent public institution of state that contributes to the building, strengthening, and preservation of democracy in the nation. The civil society promotes civic participation (Bhatta, 2007), and offers a shared forum to work together for citizens' interests and benefit. Civil society actors reveal their importance as facilitators, conveners, innovators, service providers, and supporters (World Economic Forum, 2013). As per Bhatta (2007), civil society facilitates the democratization of society, the rule of law, governance, and delivery of services to poor and marginalized groups. He also argued that civil society in Nepal is fairly new despite the age-old existence of civic practices. In the present day, civil society has become quite famous. Civil society organizations are the most respected public institution in Nepal after the Nepal Army and

media. Citizens' trust in civil society organizations seems strong. This might be citizens perceived that civil society makes the state accountable, and has the power to influence, limit, and control the state power for the interest and benefit of citizens. Similarly, civil society bridge the gap between the government and citizens, mediate between the state and society, promote national self-esteem, raised voice against corruption and irregularities, protection of consumer interests, raise the voice of the underprivileged, develop social consciousness, utilize and mobilize social capital, preserve heritage, uplift the social culture sector, facilitate democracy and development, and so on. Civil society organizations generally enjoy good status and trust among Nepali citizens (see Table 4.1), but they are not entirely free from criticism. It is criticized for not maintaining autonomy and independence. They are blamed for attachment and affiliation to the political parties for seeking political command and authority. Hatlebakk (2017) argued that Nepal has an active civil society, but with limited influence due to the dominance of the political parties. They are also accused of working in the interest of donors against the national interest in making dollars. Civil society organizations must be independent and work in the interests of the nation and citizens to maintain and sustain citizens' trust. They must perform their role as watchdog, advocator, service provider, expert, capacity builder, incubator, representative, champion of citizenship, a supporter of solidarity, and standard-setting (World Economic Forum, 2013). Civil society should carry out its tasks autonomously, without the influence of politics, donors, and lobbyists, to ensure credibility and foster healthy democracy in the nation.

5.1.4 User Group

The so-called user group is a group of people (7-11 members) who have been directly involved, engaged, and benefited from the implementation and operation of the development project. The user group is formed by consensus and unanimity through the assembly of beneficiaries themselves and formed a committee which is popularly known as the user committee. The committee should be set up as unanimously as possible, but if a consensus cannot be reached, the user committee should be set up by a majority. The Committee is responsible for the construction, operation, management, and maintenance of the development project (Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development [MOFALD], 2018). It is a democratic exercise for the mobilization and empowerment of the local community in the development project. It ensures their ownership of the development project through active participation and engagement. As per the Local Government Operations Act (2017), provision is made for the creation and monitoring of a user committee for development projects to be carried out within the ward. Similarly, this act also provides for the monitoring and regulation of the functions of user committees, and user committees must work in coordination with the local level. This provision makes the user committee responsible and responsive for its actions, decisions, and performance, which contribute to ensuring good governance in its delivery system. Citizens' trust in the user committee seems fairly high and satisfactory (see Table 4.1). This is because local people are directly involved and engaged in governance, administration, and management of development. Similarly, beneficiaries themselves are

involved in the selection of members of the user committee. As per the procedure for the formation, operation, and management of local user committees (2018), representatives of the people, political party officials, government employees, and teachers are not allowed to be members of the user committee. At times, however, these groups of people play hidden politics in the selection of members (own people) and influence (also called elite influence) their behavior in their interests. There is no doubt that the user committee works for people and the benefit of the community, but it is not entirely free from criticism. User committees are blamed for working against legal criteria, misuse of positions to benefit themselves or anyone else, involvement in corruption and irregularities, and failure to maintain financial discipline. To avoid these faults and maintain a high level of citizens' trust, the user committee should carry out its task as per rule in the interest and benefit of the community.

5.1.5 Media

The media is a means and source of communication, and is considered to be the fourth body of the nation. The issue of media trust has been a recurring topic of interest in literature over the years (Splendore & Curini, 2020). In recent years, in Nepal, citizens' trust in the media has received growing attention among journalists, academics, citizens, politicians, policymakers, and so on. The media have been essential in building Nepal (Hatlebakk, 2017). Democracy in the nation is reinforced with the help of the media. Evidence has shown that media is the most trusted public institution in Nepal after the Nepal Army (see Table 4.1). More or less similar kinds of findings were also found in a survey of Nepali People (2018). According to this survey, Nepali citizens have placed a high level of trust in the media. Almost 91.3 percent of the survey respondents expressed their trust in media. It is a good sign, but it seems a challenge to maintain and sustain this truth in the coming year, because media trust is complex, and based on both experience and future expectations (Splendore & Curini, 2020). Citizen trust in media is generally determined by the performance of journalists, their fairness, honesty, and professionalism (Splendore & Curini, 2020). It is a critical driver of media trust. Media trust is also integral to credibility, and quality is linked to credibility. Quality should be fully guaranteed at all levels at all costs. Information provided by the media should be accurate, fair, balanced, and bias-free in principle, but sometimes the media delivers imprecision, biases fake news, and misinterprets for cheap popularity. Nepali media is sometimes criticized for not standing independently and delivering information influenced by the government, politicians, and political parties. It reduces public trust in the media. Media should be far from political-economic politics and should play an active role as a watchdog/ombudsman in the interests of citizens and the nation. Maintaining a code of conduct and professionalism, demonstrating a high level of commitment, being ethical and independent, free from bias, and prejudices are the primary and mandatory requirements for maintaining and sustaining citizens' trust in media.

5.1.6 Civil Servants/Bureaucrats

A civil servant/bureaucrat is an active government actor working in the civil service organization of Nepal. Nepali civil service is the government body that works with the merit-based appointed officials to administer the nations' administration and enforce the peoples' welfare policy (Gupta, Bhandari & Manandhar, 2020). Principally, there should be a high level of citizens' trust in civil servants/bureaucrats, but evidence has shown that there is a low level of citizens' trust (see Table 4.1). It seems that all the efforts made by the Nepal government are becoming a waste. Citizens are not satisfied with their performance of civil servants/bureaucrats even though the Nepali government is recruiting a highly competent workforce every year through merit-based (Paudel & Gupta, 2019). Civil servants/bureaucrats are blamed for buck-passing, delaying, self-seeking behavior, unaccountable, corrupt, and irresponsible. Shakya (2009) argued that civil servants/bureaucrats are unable to make a positive impression on the citizens they serve. As a result, the citizen has low trust. For ensuring high performance in civil service, the Nepal government has formed different committees such as Buch Commission 1952; Acharya Commission 1956; Jha Commission 1968, Thapa Commission 1975, Administrative Reform Commission 1991, Administrative Reform Management Committee 1992 and High-Level Administrative Reform Committee 2014 and so on. Similarly, the Government of Nepal has also passed different laws and policies such as the constitution of Nepal 2015, civil service act 1993 and rules 1993, local self-governance act and rules 1999, corruption prevention act 2002, public procurement act and regulation 2007, right to information act 2007, good governance (management & operation) act 2008, local government operation act 2017, 15th development plan (2019/20-2023/24), and so on. Moreover, the Government of Nepal has also formed institutional mechanisms such as the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, National Vigilance Centre, Office of the Auditor-General, Revenue Investigation Department, and so on. Even if such committees, laws/policies, and institutional mechanisms, citizens do not report higher trust. There is no confusion that some civil servants/bureaucrats perform very well and meets the needs, concerns, and demands of citizens effectively and efficiently. Many citizens are not satisfied with the performance and traditional working style of many civil servants/bureaucrats. If this happens for a long time, the full trust of the citizen will be completely lost, creating a barrier to the realization of democracy in the country. Therefore, civil servants/bureaucrats must immediately change its traditional working style to restore citizens' trust. Restoration of trust is not achieved overnight and requires the careful crafting of the bureaucratic culture. This is a key and unavoidable requirement.

5.1.7 Local Government

The Constitution of Nepal (2015) envisaged three levels of government viz. federal, provincial, and local level. Local-level, also popularly known as local government, is the lowest unit of government (municipalities and rural municipality). It is perceived as the nearest and closest government to people. Local government has a duty not only to institutionalize local governance by establishing an enabling atmosphere to foster democratic values and

public engagement in decision-making, but also to drive social and economic growth to enhance the quality and prosperity of community life (Acharya, 2018). The Nepali citizen showed enormous faith in local government and claimed that the local government taking care of them, listening to and addressing their concerns, and settling local conflicts (Survey of Nepali People 2018). Evidence has shown that citizen trust in local government seems to be very good (see Table 4.1). This may be local-level election influence, as this survey (NNGS) was conducted as soon as the local-level election was over. Local elections have not been held due to political instability, and local administrative and development governance has been severely affected for a long time. Elections to the local body were held in 2017 after 15 years. Politicians had pledged for the socio-economic well-being of local citizens according to their election manifesto. Citizens had strong aspirations and hopes from the local government. As a result, citizens at that time were highly trusted in local government, but this scenario has changed slightly. Now a lot of local governments are critical of their big promises, and are unable to deliver on their promises. Local governments have not shown visible signs of a functioning local democracy, and have faced several challenges. Citizens criticize local government actors for their involvement in corruption, infringement of integrity and honesty, poor governance and coordination, failure to maintain public accountability, transparency and responsiveness, and effective and efficient delivery of basic public services. The decline in citizens' trust raises the question of the legitimacy of the local government, and creates a barrier to grassroots democracy and difficulty in achieving a vision for a happy Nepali and prosperous Nepal. Local governments, therefore, need to change and adopt citizens and development-friendly strategies immediately to maintain, restore, and optimize citizens' trust. This is a primary and mandatory requirement.

5.1.8 Court

A court is a justice providing public institution which exercises power relating to justice for maintaining the rule of law in the nation. As per the constitution of Nepal (2015), powers relating to justice in Nepal shall be exercised by courts and other judicial bodies under this constitution, other laws and the recognized principles of justice, and all shall abide by the orders or decisions made in the course of the trial of lawsuits by the courts, and powers relating to justice in Nepal shall be exercised by Supreme Court, High Court, and District Court. Judicial work is the core function of the court (Supreme Court, 2009). The Nepali judiciary has a vision of establishing an independent, competent, inexpensive, speedy, effective justice system that is accessible to the public and ensures justice for all (Supreme Court, 2009). According to Kiršienė and Gruodyte (2019), trust in the judiciary is inseparably linked to trust in the courts, because the judiciary is a key player in the justice system. They further argued that trust among citizens is essential for the successful functioning of the justice system. Citizens' trust represents judicial legitimacy (Bühlmann & Kunz, 2011). The judiciary and the administration of justice need to generate a certain degree of confidence (Trontti, Harakka, & Pyöriä, 2019). Trust in the judiciary is needed for the voluntary adoption of judicial decisions (Grimmelikhuijsen & Klijn, 2015). Evidence has shown that

the citizens' trust in court is not very high, but seems to be adequate in some way (see Table 4.1). Nepali citizens are quite positive about the conduct and performance of the courts. Kiršienė and Gruodytė (2019) argued that professional, legitimate, fair, respectful behavior is not only desirable but is a prerequisite for effective performance, which creates public confidence. The trust of citizens in court depends on variety of factors since trust in the justice system is multidimensional (Van de Walle, 2009). Impartiality, incorruptibility, and trustworthiness of the judiciary (Aydın Çakır, & Şekercioğlu, 2016) are vital for public trust in courts (Kiršienė & Gruodytė, 2019). Trust cannot be assumed but should be established by implementing the core value of justice. Independent, professionalism, creditworthiness, fairness, impartiality, maintain time standard, dignity, integrity, transparency, and accountability in the administration of justice, are the prerequisites for the establishment, maintenance, and enhancement of citizen trust in the court or the judiciary. Nepal Judiciary's Third Five Year Strategic Plan (2014-2019) emphasizes ensuring a speedy delivery of justice, reliable judicial procedures, and accessible justice system, and enhanced public confidence/trust in the judiciary (Supreme Court, 2014). It is clear from this that the Nepal justice sector is in the process of establishing, maintaining, and enhancing citizens' trust. Citizen trust in the courts or judiciaries increases credibility and leads to improving the nations' democracy. Citizens' trust in the courts/judiciary, therefore, is essential for establishment as a legitimate public institution.

5.1.9 Ministers

The minister is a politician who heads the ministry and governs it. Each nation in the world, as per the constitutional provision, is nominated ministers for a fixed period after the winning of the election. Ministries determine policy for the welfare of the citizens and country within tenure. Citizens expect politicians to work for their benefit and deliver their promises. For this, ministers are formulated and enforced ministry-related policies and fulfill their functions as the chief hierarchical leader of the ministry. A minister performs a more complex role in public relations that consists of not only selling policy programs, but also political values such as prosperity, patriotism, unity, desire for law and order, and promoting democratic processes to the general public (Headey, 1974). Trust in ministers is therefore important to ensure legitimacy in government. Citizens' trust in ministers, however, seems to be very low (see Table 4.1). Citizens are not satisfied with their performance, actions, and decisions. Citizens accuse ministers of their self-interest, rather than working for the interests of the nation and citizens. When the election wins, ministers are forgotten about their electorate and concentrated in the city. Ministers have also failed to give full attention to the welfare of nations and citizens without self-interest. Millions of citizens who voted with high expectations and aspirations were abused. Now and then, daily newspapers keep reporting on ministers' involvement in various malpractices such as corruption. Ministers are blamed most often for corruption. The finance discipline is not properly followed by ministers. Similarly, citizens are the question that rises in ministerial competency and performance. Through posts and comments on social media such as

Twitter and Facebook, it has been cleared that there is very low trust in ministers. Most ministers are unable to fulfill their positional obligations and to be accountable to citizens. No one is permitted to go against the laws, but much of the time ministers do not follow laws. As a result, citizens' trust in the minister is declining. Restoring trust in ministers is challenging, but possible. For this, ministers should work in the interests of the nation and the citizen with integrity. Ministers should step forward by understanding the distortions and anomalies in the past practice and correcting the weaknesses in the delivery. This is the first and primary requirement.

5.1.10 Parliaments

Parliament is a core political decision-making body in all democratic systems (O'Brien, Stapenhurst & Johnston, 2008). It is considered as a legislative authority in the state (National Democratic Institute, 2006). Good parliaments form legislation and laws that address citizens' needs, which foster balanced and fair development (Power, 2012). Parliaments set budgets, determine policies, and establish moral standards of society (Holmberg, Lindberg & Svensson, 2017). This is the body dealing with the passage of legislation and monitoring the performance of the executive authority (National Democratic Institute, 2006). The Parliament of Nepal, also known as the Federal Parliament, is a political institution that exercises the sovereignty of the people. According to the Constitution of Nepal (2015), there is a Federal Legislature composed of two chambers, namely the House of Representatives (also known as the Lower House) and the Federal Parliament (also known as the Upper House). Representatives of the people are members of parliament called Parliamentarians. The federal parliaments' lower house and upper house have 275 and 59 members respectively. These members are involved in formulating the laws within the jurisdiction relating to federal, concurrent, and residual power, forming a government, discussing and approving governments' policies/programs and budgets of government, making decisions on constitution amendment and general referendum, supervising the government performance, giving necessary directions and suggestions to the government, and so on. Therefore, for the functioning of a society, trust in parliament is possibly more critical than trust in many other institutions (Rolef, 2006).

In most democracies, less than half of citizens have trust in parliament (Holmberg, Lindberg & Svensson, 2017). Nepali parliamentarians are also failed to build higher trust among citizens. Citizens' trust in them is very low (see Table 4.1). This shows that citizens are not satisfied with the performance of parliamentarians. Nepali citizens generally blame them for not maintaining financial discipline, failing to fulfill their constitutional duty and obligation with morality, failing to be honest, accountable, open, attentive, efficient, effective, and fair in their performance. As per Rai (2019), members of parliament are accused by citizens of forgetting their electoral district after the elections and of not understanding the citizens' concerns. She further argued that citizens' concerns are often heard that parliamentarians are concentrated in the city, and that the electoral district and its voters are not consulted during the formulation of legislation. Parliamentarians have failed to give full attention to

the development and welfare of the nation and citizens without self-interest. These are some of the potential reasons for low trust in Nepali parliamentarians. Parliamentarians should act in the best interests of citizens, which is crucial and fundamental to maintaining trust and ensuring the legitimacy of democracy. Holmberg, Lindberg, and Svensson (2017) argued that, if citizens do not trust the central institution by which they can exercise 'peoples' rule over themselves' then democracy itself is at risk. They also argued that high parliamentary citizen trust would make the democratic system more effective. Parliament must, therefore, act in the interests of the nation and citizens to build up trust.

5.1.11 Political Parties

A political party is a key institution in political systems (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005) without which there can be no democracy. Political parties are an essential and necessary part of the democratic process (Dalton & Weldon, 2005). A political party, also known as a political institution, where organized groups of dedicated people with the same political ideology come together to gain/exercise political power, win elections, run a government, and influence/determine public policy. The political party also requires government powers to be exercised and government regulated for the benefit of the people. The political party's goal in a representative democracy is to win elections, maintain power, and implement policies (Kim, 2007). When a member of a political party is elected, they have to take responsibility for running the government. The constitution of Nepal 2015, part-29 has a provision related to a political party. Nepali citizen has the freedom to form and get associated with a political party. As per this constitution, persons who are committed to common political ideology, philosophy, and program under the law can form and operate political parties, and generate, or cause to be generated, publicity to secure support and cooperation from the general public for their ideology, philosophy, and program or carry out other necessary activity for this purpose.

Several political parties in Nepal stand to win an election. At the time of the election, as per their election manifesto, political parties committed citizens to fulfill their demands and concerns. During the election campaign, the political party tries to convince the citizen that it expresses the interests of the voters better than the other political parties (Kim, 2007). A political party should, after the winning election, legally translate the aspirations of the citizen into practice. Citizens' trust in the political party depends on what they gain from it. Political parties should be responsible for what they do (Corral, 2008). Citizens expect the political parties to fulfill their demands and concerns at the earliest. If political parties address citizen demands and expectations promptly, they gain the trust of the citizen. Internationally, however, political parties are the least trusted institutions (Dalton & Weldon, 2005), and Nepal isn't exceptional. Trust in a political party is accepted as an integral element of a functioning democracy. Citizen trust in a political party, however, is decreasing. Citizen trust in a political party in Nepal is relatively low (see Table 4.1). Citizens aren't happy with the political parties' performance. Citizens often criticize and blame political parties for low performance. Meanwhile, political parties are now being

blamed for their numbers. One hundred thirty-one (dated 2020/07/03) political parties are registered on the election commission, Nepal. Some of the political parties are regional and caste-based. Regional and caste-based political parties have also been praised and criticized. It is praised by the same regional and ethnic citizens, and are criticized by other ethnics and regional citizens. Political parties should be functioning with the system, it is said, but their roles are controlled several times by personal self-interest. There is also an ongoing rivalry within the political party to gain positional power. Several Nepali political parties tend to have structural weakness and poor degree of institutionalization. The behavior of opposition political parties has also led to declining trust in a political party. Political parties, when they are in power, assume everything is better, but when they are not in power (oppositions), the work of the ruling party is worse. Nepal's political parties are disintegrating and unifying. Time and again, more than two parties are integrated and disintegrating/fragmenting after a certain period. The journey of unification of political parties has not been able to become shared and dynamic due to the lack of a viable combination of objectives, goals, and strategies. The political parties fail to pay enough attention to the day-to-day problems of the citizens, inability to lift a strong voice against corruption, bigotry, and intolerance, failure to uphold laws, irresponsible and unaccountable to citizens, unable to maintain honesty and integrity, and so on. These are some of the reasons why political parties are losing citizens' trust. For restoring the trust, political parties should change their working culture, and perform duties with honesty in the interest of the nation and people.

5.2 Conclusion

Citizens' trust in public and political institutions has been extensively studied throughout the world including Nepal. Citizens' trust in public and political institutions is an essential precondition for an effective, sustainable, and healthy democracy within the country. Citizens' trust is heavily reliant on institutional conduct and performance. The government of Nepal has given higher priority for accumulating higher citizens' trust via excellent performance. However, evidence has shown that there is not a satisfactory level of citizens' trust (NASC, 2018). Political institutions appear to be least trusted in the perception of the citizen. Citizens' trust in public institutions appears high as compared with political institutions. Citizens have higher trust in the army and media, and the lowest trust in police and civil servants/bureaucrats. Citizens' trust levels in these institutions are varied by demographic, social associations, and other variables. Effective and efficient performance is the most important factor in assessing citizens' trust. Citizens have a high level of trust when they perceive the performance of institutions to be satisfactory. Citizens expect institutions to meet their interests, expectations, and concerns at all levels and any cost. Low citizens' trust in public and political institutions has shown that citizens are not fully satisfied with the performance. These institutions are unable to completely fulfilling citizens' desires and interests, which raises the question of institutions' legitimacy. Citizens' trust is, therefore, crucial to institutional legitimacy. Public and political institutions should be fair, professional, accountable, responsive, transparent, and show respectful behavior with a high level of honesty and integrity in their performance. It is the primary and mandatory

requirement to maintain the citizens' trust. It contributes not only to the strengthening of democracy in the nation, but also achieve the vision of happy Nepali and prosperous Nepal. Citizens' trust in public and political institutions is, therefore, decisive.

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